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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BRANZBURG REVISITED: THE CONTINUING
SEARCH FOR A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
FOR NEWSMEN
A popular government without popular information or the
means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy
or perhaps both.
Writings of James Madison
The right of a newsman ' to conceal the source and substance of
confidential information given to him in his newsgathering capacity has
been the subject of intense debate and judicial controversy over the past
three years. Proponents of the privilege have invariably rested their
claim on one of three bases; (1) that a common law testimonial
privilege should be recognized, (2) that the first amendment to the
United States Constitution should be interpreted to grant protection for
journalists or (3) that the individual states should be permitted, at their
discretion, to provide statutory shield legislation.2
To date, no jurisdiction has recognized a common law privilege for
journalists. 3 Advocates of a constitutional privilege suffered a severe
setback in 1972 when the United States Supreme Court ruled in Branz-
burg v. Hayes4 that a newsman's first amendment guarantees of freedom
of speech and press are not abridged by compelling him to disclose the
source of confidential information before a grand jury. In the wake of
1. "Newsman" is used interchangeably with "reporter" and "journalist" in this com-
ment to refer to those individuals regularly engaged in the gathering, compilation and
dissemination of information to the public through their employment in some media ca-
pacity. There is no standard definition of a newsman used by the courts and states.
2. For a unique argument advocating federal legislation granting newsmen a privi-
lege against compulsory disclosure based on the commerce clause (journalism as a fea-
ture of interstate commerce) see Note, State Newsman's Privilege Statutes: A Critical
Analysis, 49 NoTRE DAME LAw. 150, 161 (1973).
3. Arguments for a common law privilege will not be dealt with in this comment
due to a lack of judicial recognition of such a privilege in any American jurisdiction.
For a discussion of cases rejecting the privilege see 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966). See also
8 WIGMoRE, EVmENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Wigmore rejects the idea of
a common law privilege for journalists.
4. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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Branzburg, several states5 passed legislation affording a qualified statu-
tory privilege to newsmen. In 1974, Oklahoma became the twenty-
sixth state8 to adopt such protection.7
This comment has four objectives: (1) to explore the conflicting
premises underlying the entire area of controversy-the right of the
public to the free flow of information as opposed to the obligation of
every citizen to give testimony; (2) to examine the present status of the
constitutional privilege in light of cases subsequent to Branzburg; (3)
to evaluate existing state privilege statutes and their effectiveness as
shields for newsmen; and (4) to focus on the Oklahoma statute, as yet
judicially uninterpreted, and offer some insight into the protection an
Oklahoma newsman can expect under the law as it now stands.
I. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
Generally, the issue of a newsman's privilege arises in the following
situations: (a) where a public official or an investigatory body of the
state subpoenas a newsman to testify or to produce documents reveal-
ing a confidential source of information or some undisclosed informa-
tion itself; (b) where a private civil litigant seeks to learn the source of
information relating to the cause of action in which he is involved; or
(c) where a defendant in a criminal case subpoenas the newsman's
product for use in his defense.8 Arguments in favor of a testimonial
privilege are frequently grounded in the free flow of information pro-
tected by the first amendment.' This reasoning generally follows one of
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-
19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975-76); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (Supp. 1975-76);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -146 (1974); N.D. Cmr. CoDE § 31-01-06.2 (Supp.
1975); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1 to
-3 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-113 to -115 (Supp. 1975).
6. States with privilege statutes prior to Branzburg include ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370
(1960); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1973); ARiz. RV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237
(Supp. 1975-76); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West
Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-3-5-1 (Bums Supp. 1975); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
421.100 (1970); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1975); MD. CTS. & JuD. PRO.
CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974); Micir. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (1968); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 93-701-4 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1971); N.Y STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Cv.
RIrrrS LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1975-76); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2739.12
(1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1975-76).
7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 385.1 (Supp. 1975).
8. Comment, Constitutional Protection for the Newsman's Work Product, 6 HARv.
Crv. RiGHTs-CIv. Lm. L. REv. 119, 120 (1970).
9. For an in-depth treatment of arguments favoring a constitutional privilege for
newsmen see Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Guest & Stanzler].
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two lines: (1) It is contended that the first amendment embraces
protection of the public's right to be informed. When a newsman is
compelled to divulge the source of information imparted in confidence,
one of his newsgathering techniques,'0 reliance on confidential sources,
is severely impaired. As a result, the public suffers through a
diminished flow of information." (2) While the first amendment does
not specifically protect newsgathering, the Supreme Court has declared
that freedom of the press is to be given its most sweeping scope.' 2
Therefore, compulsory disclosure is an impediment to newsgathering
and indirectly a restraint on freedom of the press prohibited by the first
amendment.
A second argument favoring the privilege is that informants will
refuse to come forward with information in the absence of a guarantee
of anonymity. This reluctance is attributable not only to the inform-
ant's fear that a subpoenaed newsman might reveal his identity,' 3 but
also to his knowledge that a journalist who does not betray his confi-
dence might well go to jail. To prevent this, the informant may simply
keep the information to himself.' 4
Similarly, a third argument broaches the reporter-source relation-
ship from the standpoint of the reporter. In the absence of a privilege,
the reporter may be hesitant to rely on confidential information in
controversial areas where the likelihood of a grand jury investigation
exists. Faced with a subpoena to testify, the newsman must choose
between equally undesirable alternatives of breaching a confidence or
being held in civil contempt. In addition, he is forced to elect between
responsiveness to the court and his profession's code of ethics.'"
10. For a breakdown of reliance on sources as a newsgathering technique in news-
papers, magazines, television and radio see Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Em-
pirical Study, 70 MicH. L. Rav. 229, table IV at 249 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Blasi].
11. "The reporter's constitutional right to a confidential relationship with his source
stems from the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information to the pub-
lic." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
12. E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940).
13. Blasi asked a cross section of newsmen if they would be willing to go to jail
to protect an important source relationship they thought should be privileged but was
not under existing law, knowing the sentence could vary between thirty days to six
months. Out of almost 1000 respondents, 68.4 percent said yes, 14.4 percent said no,
and 17.2 percent did not answer the question. The results indicate strong reluctance
by most newsmen to reveal a source. Blasi, supra note 10, at 276.
14. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 9, at 46.
15. "Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confi-
dential information in court or before judicial or investigative bodies." THE NnwsPAH'n
AND SocmTy 567 (G. Bird & F. Merwin eds. 1946).
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Finally, proponents of the privilege point to the potential abuse of
the subpoena power if newsmen are required to disclose confidential
information. 16 It is not difficult to envision how the government, armed
with an unfettered subpoena power, could effectively deter politically
embarrassing news "leaks" from inside sources. For instance, under the
guise of an investigation into a newsman's allegations of governmental
corruption, a grand jury could be convened and the reporter forced to
reveal the source of his accusations. The mock investigation could then
be terminated and the "leak" effectively sealed.17
Opponents of the privilege usually advance three basic argu-
ments.' 8 First, it is contended that recognition of a newsman's privilege
will hamper judicial administration by reducing the availability of ad-
missible testimony. "A court of law more easily can reach a fair
consideration of the issues through compulsory testimony."'19 A second
argument, allied to the first, is that the privilege could easily be abused,
resulting in the frustration of justice. A journalist could fan public
indignation and force an investigation into an area on the basis of
accusations made by a confidential informant and then rely on his
testimonial privilege to frustrate the very investigation he was responsi-
ble for instigating. 20 Finally, opponents argue there is a lack of evi-
dence that without a privilege a newsman's sources will dry up."- In the
absence of such evidence, they claim, any privilege becomes not a shield
for informants but a sword for journalistic irresponsibility.2
16. Blasi reports that one of the most commonly voiced complaints of newsmen is
the frequency with which press subpoenas are issued. Blasi, supra note 10, at 261.
17. Guest & Stanzler relate an actual incident of this abuse of the grand jury
process. An Atlanta newspaper printed an expos6 on the sale of narcotics within the
state prison based on information from an anonymous physician. A grand jury was con-
vened and the editor of the newspaper was cited for contempt for refusing to reveal his
source's identity. The editor claimed the purpose of the hearing was geared more toward
uncovering his source than investigating the alleged drug peddling. The doctor insisted
the editor expose him rather than go to jail. Once his identity was disclosed, the pro-
ceeding was terminated without farther investigation into the allegations. Guest &
Stanzler, supra note 9, at 45-46.
18. For an extensive treatment of arguments rejecting a newsman's privilege see
Beaver, The Newsman's Code, the Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Rightto Evidence,
47 ORE. L. REv. 243 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Beaver].
19. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 9, at 24.
20. Beaver, supra note 18, at 257.
21. Id. at 251-52. But see Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir.
1970) where the court found that "'compelled disclosure of information received by a
journalist within the scope of such confidential relationships jeopardizes those relation-
ships and thereby impairs the journalist's ability to gather, analyse and publish the
news."' Accord, Blasi, supra note 10, on the case of Anthony Ripley at 262.
22. Beaver, supra note 18, at 256.
1975]
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II. THE EVOLVING QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
Most observers felt Branzburg28 tolled the death knell for any
privilege grounded in the Constitution. Certainly, the Supreme Court
made it quite clear that in the grand jury context a newsman has no first
amendment privilege to withhold confidential information. "We are
asked to create another testimonial privilege by interpreting the First
Amendment to grant newsmen a [testimonial privilege] that other citizens
do not enjoy. This we decline to do."'24  Subsequent decisions over the
past three years, however, have caused considerable confusion as to how
Branzburg is to be interpreted.25 Some have rekindled hope that at
least a qualified privilege for newsmen may yet be found in the first
amendment.
Lightman v. State,20 decided less than two months after Branzburg,
involved a claimed testimonial privilege under both a state statute27 and
23. The Branzburg opinion was a 5-4 decision, involving a trilogy of cases consoli-
dated for appeal to the Supreme Court. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. App.
1971) involved a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal who wrote an article about
his observations of two men synthesizing hashish from marijuana. He was subpoenaed
but refused to reveal the identity of the two hashish makers. Reporter Branzburg also
sought review of the denial of his motion to quash a second subpoena relating to a later
story he wrote concerning conversations and observations with unnamed drug users in
Frankfort, Kentucky.
In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971) concerned a television newsman-
photographer who gained entrance to a Black Panther headquarters on the condition he
would not disclose anything he saw or heard inside the building. The Supreme Court
granted Pappas' writ of certiorari after a denial of his motion to quash a subpoena seek-
ing his testimony on observations at the meeting.
Caldwel v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970) involved a New York
Times reporter who was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury to testify about the
aims, purposes and activities of the Black Panthers, an organization he had been as-
signed to cover. The United States petitioned for certiorari after the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed a contempt order against Caldwell by a district court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Branzburg and Pappas holdings and reversed the
Caldwell decision.
24. 408 U.S. at 690.
25. State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974) limited Branzburg to situations
where there are no alternative means to acquire the desired information. Beverly v.
United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972) and Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) expanded Branzburg to any situation involving a grand jury proceeding.
Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974) extended Branzburg to civil cases while
Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) limited Branzburg to criminal
proceedings. United States v. Nixon, 417 U.S. 682 (1974) held that Branzburg was not
confined to reporters but could be expanded to other individuals.
26. 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, aff'd 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972). A
reporter for a Baltimore newspaper wrote an article on his observations in an Ocean
City pipe shop where pipes for smoking hashish and marihuana were sold. The shop
allowed customers to smoke some marihuana in a selected pipe before making a pur-
chase. The reporter was subpoenaed by a grant jury to disclose the name of the shop
and its proprietor.
27. Mn. Ors. & JuD. PRo. CoDE ANN. § 9-112 (1974).
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the first amendment. The Maryland court found that the newsman
failed to qualify for protection under the state statute, 2 and summarily
dismissed the asserted first amendment privilege, relying on Branzburg
as dispositive of any constitutional argument. "That no such violation
of the federal constitutional guarantees exists in such circumstances has
now been made clear by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Branzburg v. Hayes .... -29 The court also ruled that any broaden-
ing of a testimonial privilege could only be done by the legislature.80
In In re Bridge,3 a New Jersey court refused to exempt confiden-
tial information given to a newsman by a public official from the
Branzburg rule. Bridge, held to have waived his statutory privilege,32
contended that unless the identity of a public official and any informa-
tion provided by the official but not published were protected by the
first amendment, the "'government' will have an effective tool to pre-
vent its wrongdoings from being brought to the attention of the public
. . . ."8 The court rejected this argument, as well as Bridge's plea for
a balancing of interests test, on the basis of Branzburg.4
On the other hand, in Baker v. F & F Investment,8 5 a federal class
action suit by blacks involving racial discrimination in the sale of
housing, a district court refused to extend Branzburg to civil actions.
The court held that absent the grand jury context, a journalist could not
28. The court held the statutory privilege was not intended to extend protection to
a newsman from testifying about his personal observations.
29. 15 Md. App. at -, 294 A.2d at 157.
30. This holding is in response to the Supreme Court's language in Branzburg that
it was powerless to bar a state court from construing its own state's constitution to recog-
nize either a qualified or absolute newsman's privilege. 408 U.S. at 706. On this basis
the Maryland court could have interpreted their state statute as protecting even the per-
sonal observations of a newsman.
31. 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972). Reporter Bridge
wrote an article concerning an alleged offer of a bribe to a member of the Newark Hous-
ing Authority. When a grand jury investigating the bribe attempt subpoenaed Bridge
to appear, he moved to quash the subpoena.
32. The court held Bridge waived his privilege under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-
29 (1976) by disclosing part of the privileged matter in his story without coercion and
with knowledge of his privilege. 120 N.J. Super. at -, 295 A.2d at 6.
33. 120 N.J. Super. at -, 295 A.2d at 6.
34. Bridge asserted the court should implement the balancing test suggested by Jus-
tice Powell in his concurring opinion in Branzburg:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of
a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citi-
zens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance
of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis ac-
cords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). The majority opinion in
Branzburg recognized no such test.
35. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
1975]
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be required to disclose his sources where the information sought did not
go to the heart of the plaintiff's claim.Y
Democratic National Committee v. McCord17 followed the Baker
decision in denying compulsory disclosure in a civil action. Reporters
for The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Washington Star-
News and Time Magazine were subpoenaed by the Committee for the
Re-election of the President and others to appear for depositions and to
bring with them all documents, tapes, photographs and other evidence
relating to the Watergate break-in. District Judge Charles Richey,
noting the noncriminal nature of the pending cases, granted a motion to
quash the subpoenas, citing the absence of any evidence that the infor-
mation sought was material to the case or that alternative sources of
evidence had been exhausted.
The Unique Circumstances and Great Public Impor-
tance of These Cases Compel a Finding by the Court
That Movants Are Entitled to At Least a Qualified Privi-
lege Under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution ...
. . . This Court cannot blind itself to the possible "chill-
ing effect" the enforcement of these broad subpoenas would
have on the flow of information to the press, and so to the
public. This Court stands convinced that if it allows the dis-
couragement of investigative reporting into the highest levels
of government no amount of legal theorizing could allay the
public suspicions engendered by its actions and by the matters
alleged in these lawsuits. 8
In Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court,39 the court refused to
extend the qualified first amendment privilege concept to Massachusetts.
A reporter for The Wall Street Journal wrote an article quoting an
unnamed town official as saying a certain named developer was using a
town "anti-snob zoning law" to blackmail town officials. The develop-
er brought a libel action against Dow Jones and the newsman and took
an oral deposition of the reporter to discover the name of the quoted
official. The reporter refused to answer and the court compelled disclo-
sure. Dow Jones was distinguished by the court from Baker as involv-
ing a party deponent and confidential information central to the plain-
tiffs case. The court also expanded the Branzburg ruling by holding
36. Id. at 783.
37. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
38. Id. at 1396-97 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
39. 303 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1973).
[Vol. 11:258
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that a Massachusetts newsman has no qualified first amendment privi-
lege in a criminal or civil action.40
In re Lewis4' did little to clarify the confusing application of the
Branzburg doctrine. Lewis, a broadcaster for a California radio station,
was served by a federal grand jury with a subpoena duces tecum for a
communiqu6 received by the station from the New World Liberation
Front, an underground terrorist organization. The contents of the
communiqu6 had been made public by the radio station42 and con-
cerned bombings and threats of future bombings in the Los Angeles
area. Lewis refused to comply with the subpoena and was found guilty
of civil contempt. In reaching that determination, the federal court
appeared to rely on the balancing test expressed in Justice Powelrs
concurring opinion in Branzburg3 to find Lewis had no testimonial first
amendment privilege.
[lt is clear and evident beyond doubt that, in striking the
proper balance between the public's interest in the free dis-
semination of ideas and information and the public's interest
in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of
justice, the Government has met its burden by establishing
beyond any reasonable doubt that the Government's interest
in the subject matter of the investigation is "immediate, sub-
stantial, and subordinating"; that there is "a substantial con-
nection" between the information it seeks to have the witness
compelled to supply and the overriding Governmental interest
in the subject matter of the investigation, and that the means
of obtaining the information is not more drastic than neces-
sary to forward the asserted Governmental interest [sic]....
[F]urther that the Court finds and concludes as a matter of
law that the balance between any possible burden on Mr.
Lewis is overwhelmingly outweighed in its balance by the
overruling and substated public interest in law enforce-
ment . .. 44
40. "We intend no implication by what we have just said that, in some future case,
it would be within the trial judge's 'discretion' to determine that a qualified newsman's
privilege exists which permits at least some protection of a journalist's confidential
sources. We have this day reaffirmed that no such privilege exists." Id. at 850.
41. 384 F. Supp. 133 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
42. The disclosure deprived Lewis of protection under the California privilege stat-
ute. See note 32 supra for a similar waiver in New Jersey.
43. 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). See note 34 supra. For a case reject-
ing the balancing test see In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3, 6 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1972). For cases adopting the balancing test see Democratic Nat'l Comm.
v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (D.D.C. 1973) and Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
44. 384 F. Supp. at 140 (citations omitted).
19751
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Two 1975 decisions have followed the trend toward limiting the
application of Branzburg to civil actions. Loadholtz v. Fields" arose in
Florida, a state providing no statutory shield protection for newsmen. A
reporter wrote a newspaper article quoting an arrested couple who
claimed they had been intimidated and harassed by police. In a libel
action by the arresting officer against the couple, the reporter was
subpoenaed to appear at a deposition to testify about his interview with
-the couple and submit certain documents. He refused to comply with
the subpoena and the plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery. In
denying the motion, the court distinguished Branzburg as involving a
grand jury subpoena relevant to a criminal investigation. The court
cited Democratic National Committee v. McCord as consistent with its
finding that the first amendment affords a newsman at least a qualified
privilege in a civil action where "no 'compelling interest' to justify the
compelled disclosure" is advanced.46
Equally significant was the Loadholtz court's recognition of the
"chilling effect" of subpoenas on the flow of information to the press
and the public.47 The plaintiff argued that no confidential source was
involved since the defendant was named in the reporter's article. Refer-
ring to this distinction as "utterly irrelevant to the 'chilling effect'," the
court found that "the compelled production of a reporter's resource
materials is equally as invidious as the compelled disclosure of his
confidential informants. 48
In Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc. 49 an action was brought
against a drug manufacturer by a patient who claimed permanent
disabilities after the drug Innovar was administered as part of the
anesthesia procedure during an operation. Both the plaintiff and de-
fendant sought to depose an officer of the The Medical Letter on Drugs
and Therapeutics in an attempt to discover the source of information in
an article published on the dangers of Innovar. The court refused to
compel disclosure, despite its finding that at issue in the case was an
important public interest in preventing future suffering and its conces-
sion that such firsthand evidence may prove impossible to obtain unless
the disclosure sought was ordered. The court held that a qualified first
amendment privilege protected against disclosure in the absence of a
compelling need, demonstrated by a showing that the information
45. 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
46. Id. at 1303.
47. Id. at 1300.
48. Id. at 1303.
49. 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
[Vol. 11:258
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sought was unavailable from other sources. The court's finding that
disclosure in the case might affect The Medical Letter's ability to obtain
the services of consulting physicians in the future' is noteworthy in light
of Branzburg, where the Supreme Court rejected as speculative the
argument that sources might dry up.51
II. THE STATUTORY APPROACH
The Court in Branzburg expressly left open the option for the
individual states to adopt shield legislation. 52  Only seventeen states
afforded any protection prior to Branzburg; nine more have passed
statutes in the subsequent three years., 3 The fact that over half the
states now recognize some statutory privilege for newsmen shows an
obvious legislative concern for insuring the continued free flow of
information. Indeed, three states preface their shield statutes with a
declaration that it is the public policy of their state to protect the free
flow of information by providing a privilege to newsmen to conceal
confidential information and sources.54
Unfortunately, the divergent approaches to statutory protection
among the states have resulted in disparate treatment on a state to state
basis for newsmen relying on the statutory privileges. The lack of
uniformity is particularly regrettable in an age when much of the
electronic media and a sizeable portion of the print media are devoted to
multistate audiences, thereby creating confusing conflict of laws prob-
lems.55
Of the twenty-six states with shield legislation, only twelve statutes
grant the newsman an absolute privilege;56 that is, once the newsman
50. Id. at 85.
51. '408 U.S. at 693.
52. "There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment
limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with re-
spect to the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas."
Id. at 706.
53. See notes 5-7 supra.
54. MnN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (Supp. 1975-76); NEB. RIv. STAT. § 20-144
(1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975).
55. For examples of potential problems see Note, State Newsman's Privilege Stat-
utes: A Critical Analysis, 49 NO-RE DAmE LAw. 150, 160 (1973).
56. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1975-
76); CAL. Evw. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns
Supp. 1975); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1970); MD. CTS. & tID. PRO. CODE ANN.
§ 9-112 (1974); MICH. CouT. LAw ANN. § 767.5a (1968); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 93-701-4 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -146 (1974); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 49.275 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (1976); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 11 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol11/iss2/5
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:258
meets the criteria set forth in the statute he cannot be divested of the
privilege even though an overriding need for disclosure is shown. The
other fourteen statutes afford only a qualified testimonial privilege that
can be overcome and the newsman thereby compelled to testify upon
various findings by the court.5 7
Fourteen statutes provide protection only against revealing the
source of confidential information,5" while ten others extend the privi-
lege to shield unpublished information as well. 9 Michigan's uninter-
preted statute could fall into either category, protecting "communica-
tions between reporters . . . and their informants."'0  Minnesota's
statute also enjoys an unclassified status, since it protects unpublished
information only if it "would tend to identify the person or means
through which the information was obtained."'
Four states have very restrictive statutes, requiring that the source
of confidential information may be withheld only if the information
given by the source has been published.2 A few of the states exempt
defamation actions based on confidential material from coverage under
their privilege statutes.63
57. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1973) (newsman may be divested of his
privilege if withholding the testimony would result in a miscarriage of justice or be con-
trary to the public interest); Aps. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964) (if it is shown that the
article was written, published or broadcast in bad faith, with malice, and not in the inter-
est of the public welfare); LA. Rav. STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1975) (if disclosure
is essential to the protection of the public interest); N.Y. Civ. Rlims LAw § 79-h (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1975-76) (if any general or specific law to the contrary exists); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 3-01-06.2 (Supp. 1975) (if failure to disclose will cause a miscarriage
of justice).
58. ALA. CODE tit. 7 § 370 (1960); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150-.220 (1973); Aiuz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1975-76); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975-76); IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-3-
5-1 (Bums Supp. 1975); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1970); LA. REv. STAT. §§
45:1451-54 (Supp. 1975); MD. Ors. & Jun. PRo. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974); NEe. Rav.
STAT. § 49.275 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-
1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 330 (Supp. 1975-76).
59. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-
26 (1974); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-701-4 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-
144 to -146 (1974); N.Y. Civ. RiGTs LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1975-76); N.D.
CENT. CoDa § 31-01-06.2 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 385.1 (Supp. 1975); ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp.
1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-113 to -115 (Supp. 1975).
60. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 767.5a (1968).
61. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.125 (Supp. 1975-76).
62. ALA. CoDE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1970); MD.
CTS. & Jun. PRo. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21, 2A:84A-
29 (1976).
63. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, 9H 111-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975-76); LA. Rnv. STAT.
§§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1975); MIN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (Supp. 1975-76);
11
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Two of the major problems with shield laws concern who and what
is protected under the statutes. Protection may be as limited as extend-
ing only to a person employed by a newspaper64 or as broad as encom-
passing employees of newspapers, periodicals, press associations, radio
and television stations and wire services.65 Some statutes are unques-
tionably outdated; for example, the 1949 Arkansas statute protects
newspapermen and employees of radio stations but makes no mention of
the television media.66
Who is Protected?
Most statutes share a common problem; while all intend to protect
basically the same group of individuals-newsmen coming into contact
with confidential sources in the course of their profession-few attempt
to define exactly who qualifies for that status. Serious problems of
interpretation arise when statutes purport to privilege "any editor, re-
porter, or other writer,"'67 "a person engaged in newspaper, radio,
television or reportorial work," 68 or a "person connected with, em-
ployed by or engaged in any medium of communication to the pub-
lic."' 9 Conceivably even copyboys and printsetters could be entitled to
protection under such broadly worded statutes.70 If the intent behind
shield laws is to shelter only employees engaged in a newsgathering
capacity, statutory language should explicitly limit protection to that
group. Unfortunately, only seven statutes define the terms "reporter"
and "newsman." 71
Current employment as a newsman appears to be required to
entitle one to protection under ten statutes.72  Thirteen states expressly
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 385.1 (Supp. 1975); Omu. Ruv. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1973);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-113 to -115 (Supp. 1975).
64. N.Y. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (1976).
65. IND. ANNT. STAT. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1975).
66. APM STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964).
67. Id.
68. ARZ. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1975-76).
69. ORE. Rev. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1973).
70. The most flagrant abuser of the broadly worded statute is Illinois. That state's
statute protects "any person" from being forced to disclose a source of information ob-
tained by a reporter during the course of his employment. Presumably, a reporter could
divulge his source to anyone, whether a newsman or not, and that person would still
qualify for shield protection under the Illinois law. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 111
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975-76).
71. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26
(1974); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-144 to
-146 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ. RiGnTs LAw § 79-
h (McKinney Supp. 1975-76); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 385.1 (Supp. 1975).
72. While not all of the statutes below expressly mandate current employment for
19751
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provide inclusion under their statutes to anyone who was a newsman at
the tinfe the confidential information was received, though not at the
time the privilege is claimed. 73  Arizona, Michigan and Ohio could fall
into either category, depending on the interpretation given to the word-
ing of their statutes. There is no ready rationale behind divesting a
newsman of his privilege on the termination of his employment regard-
ing confidential matter that came into his possession while employed.
The same interests for protecting the source are present in either situa-
tion. Those states that do not expressly extend protection beyond
employment should reevaluate their position. At the very least, states
with shield statutes worded in terms of present employment that wish to
limit protection to present employment should clarify their statutes by
amendment. Otherwise, newsmen in those states are on shaky ground
once their employment is terminated.
What is Protected?
In those states with statutes limiting protection only to the source of
information, 4 there is some question in determining whether "source"
refers only to the identify of an informant, or if it can be construed to
include other sources of confidential information. For example, should
a tape left with a radio station be considered the "source" of the
newsman's article or merely the information itself? If a newsman relies
on a secret document for his story, is the document the "source" of the.
information, and therefore, protected?
In re Taylor,75 construing the Pennsylvania "source protection
only" statute, held the prohibition against compulsory source disclosure
covers documents as well as personal informants. In arriving at that
protection, they are all worded in terms of present employment. None of the statutes
anticipate the possibility of a newsman claiming a statutory privilege regarding informa-
tion he obtained while employed after terminating his employment. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-917 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1970); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 45:1451-
54 (Supp. 1975); Mn. Crs. & Jun. PRO. CoDE ANN. § 9-112 (1974); NED. REv. STAT.
§§ 20-144 to -146 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:84A-21 (1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 385.1 (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 330 (Supp. 1975-76); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-113 to -115 (Supp. 1975).
73. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1973); CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1070 (West Supp.
1975); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-
19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975-76); IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-3-5-1 (Bums Supp. 1975); LA.
R, v. STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (Supp.
1975-76); MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. § 93-701-4 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-
1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CIrv. RiGtrrs LAW § 79-h (MeKinney Supp. 1975-76); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (Supp. 1975); Om. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1973); R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1975).
74. See note 57 supra.
75. 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1965).
[Vol. 11:258
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determination, the court ruled that the section protecting newsmen from
disclosing sources of information must be liberally construed in favor of
the news media. Maryland courts have reached the opposite result in
construing a similar shield statute. State v. Sheridan," criticizing the
Taylor decision, limited the meaning of source to the identity of the
individual informant. Lightman v. State" upheld this distinction and
ruled that the Maryland privilege statute requires a strict interpreta-
tion. 78
A second problem concerns whether, in order for the privilege to
apply, the information must be given with the understanding that it is
confidential. Again, the answer differs from state to state. In WBAI-
FM v. Proskin,79 a New York court forced a radio station to turn over a
letter concerning a bomb threat. The letter was found in a telephone
booth after an anonymous telephone tip. The court ruled that the news
source was not privileged since there was no confidential communica-
tion.
Lightman reached an opposite conclusion under the Maryland
statute, finding that any source of information provided a newsman
should be privileged, whether given in confidence or not. "[While the
Legislature may have enacted the statute with the primary purpose in
mind of protecting the identity of newsmen's confidential sources, we
think the statutory privilege broad enough to encompass any source of
news or information, without regard to whether the source gave his
information in confidence or not."80
States that have considered the problem seem to agree that a
newsman is not privileged to refuse to divulge information about events
he observes personally. In re Dan"' involved a New York newsman
who was subpoenaed to give testimony pertaining to crimes he observed
while covering the Attica prison riot. Dan refused to answer, claiming
such information was privileged under the New York shield law. The
76. 248 Md. 320, 236 A.3d 18 (1967).
77. See note 26 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
78. Most states would probably follow the Maryland trend, giving their statutes a
strict interpretation. For a different approach see State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d
442 (1969). In deciding how to interpret the New Jersey privilege statute, the court
held that privileges should be construed and applied in sensible accommodation to the
aim of a "just result." This suggests that some states may be willing to adopt a policy
of flexibility in interpreting privilege statutes. Such a stance is highly desirable in view
of the inability of most states legislatures to provide for all possible contingencies in
their statutes.
79. 42 App. Div. 2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1973).
80. 15 Md. App. at -, 294 A.2d at 156 (footnote omitted).
81. 80 Misc. 2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
1975]
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court held that while Dan was privileged to refuse to divulge the identity
of any source, he could not withhold evidence of crimes which he had
witnessed.
[T]his Court finds no proof offered that the testimony sought
of this witness involves a confidential communication or confi-
dential sources protected by this statute. None of the infor-
mation was given to him by a person requesting that his name
not be disclosed. The testimony before the Grand Jury is
about evidence he observed, not events related by an informer
or others under a cloak of confidentiality. 82
A Maryland court came to the same conclusion in Lightman,
holding a newsman could properly be compelled to disclose both the
identity of persons seen by him in the perpetration of a crime and the
address of the shop where the crime occurred.83  In light of these
holdings, a newsman would be well advised not to rely on any statutory
privilege to try to conceal evidence of any crime committed in his
presence. Presumably, for example, a reporter interviewing an under-
ground fugitive could be forced to give details concerning the meeting to
an investigatory body.
IV. THE OKLAHomA SHIELD LAW
Oklahoma's shield statute provides a newsman with a qualified
testimonial privilege to withhold the source of any published or unpub-
lished information as well as the content of unpublished information
obtained in his newsgathering capacity. 4 The privilege is conditional
because the statute permits the court to divest the claimant of his
protection on a finding that the party seeking the information has estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence the relevancy of the information
sought and an inability to obtain the information by alternate means.
The Oklahoma law expressly limits its applicability to state pro-
82. Id. at-, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
83. See note 26 supra for the facts of the case.
84. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 385.1 (Supp. 1975) provides:
No newsman shall be required to disclose in a state proceeding either:
1. The source of any published or unpublished information obtained in
the gathering, receiving or processing of information for any medium of
communication to the public; or
2. Any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, re-
ceiving or processing of information for any medium of communication to the
public;
unless the court finds that the party seeking the information or identity has
established by clear and convincing evidence that such information or identity
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ceedings,88 including hearings before any judicial, legislative, executive
or administrative body. The testimonial privilege is also expressly
denied to a newsman who is being sued for defamation and who
attempts to defend on the basis that the defamatory material originated
with a third party whom he is protected from disclosing under the
statute.
There are three strong points in the Oklahoma law. First, the
statute does not require that the information be given in confidence for a
newsman to qualify for protection. As a result, the privilege is much
broader than in those states requiring a cloak of confidentiality,8 6 ex-
tending to any information coming into a reporter's possession.
A second feature of the statute is its extension of protection to both
the source of the information and any unpublished information in the
possession of the newsman. Several states have used their "source
protection only" statutes to divest the newsman of any substantive
privilege by requiring him to divulge all unpublished information given
to him by his source. In many instances, this information could only be
known by certain individuals and upon its disclosure the informant
could be identified.
The third attribute of the Oklahoma statute is the expansiveness of
its definitions.8 7 The law expressly protects not only any written com-
munications between a reporter and his source, but also any notes,
photographs, tapes or "other data of whatever source."' 8  By clearly
detailing the material that is protected, the legislature has substantially
reduced the possibility of judicial limitations of the privilege's scope.
The statute also broadly defines "newsman" as "any. . . individu-
al regularly engaged in. . . preparing news for any newspaper, periodi-
cal, press association, newspaper syndicate, wire service, radio or televi-
sion station, or other news service."8 9  It is difficult to see how this
language could be read to exempt employees of school newspapers and
85. Nebraska is the only state whose statute purports to extend the privilege to fed-
eral as well as state proceedings. Whether a federal court would be bound by such a
statute is uncertain. It is settled that in cases arising in federal courts under diversity
jurisdiction, state law is controlling. See Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 989
(8th Cir. 1972). Where the action arises under federal question jurisdiction, courts have
reached opposite results as to whether state law must be followed. See Baker v. F &
F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding state law not determinative). But
see Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding state substantive law must
be followed).
86. See text accompanying notes 79 & 80 supra.
87. The definitions found in OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 385.2 (Supp. 1975) are patterned
closely after those in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975).
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underground publications, two groups denied statutory protection in
many states.90
While the Oklahoma law incorporates some aspects of a good
shield law, it has some serious shortcomings as well, of which newsmen
should be aware. First of all, the statute does not specify whether a
newsman can waive his privilege involuntarily. It is conceded in all
states with shield legislation that the privilege against compulsory disclo-
sure is personal to the newsman alone. Therefore, should the reporter
ohoose to voluntarily waive his right not to testify on confidential mat-
ters,91 he may divulge the source of his information, regardless of the
wishes of the informant.
A number of states, however, provide for an implied waiver; that is,
if the newsman reveals any of his unpublished information or answers
certain questions about his source (short of actually divulging his identi-
ty) he may be found to have implicitly waived his privilege.9" The
Oklahoma statute does not mention waiver, and apparently the Okla-
homa legislature did not intend to leave a loophole in the law permitting
an involuntary relinquishment of the privilege. Certainly this position is
consistent with the purpose behind all shield legislation-protecting the
public interest in the free flow of information. Nevertheless, courts in
other states without express waiver provisions have forced reporters to
testify after a finding of implicit waiver. 93 The Oklahoma statute
should be amended to expressly recognize or reject involuntary waiver.
Until such time, newsmen should approach the waiver issue with cau-
tion. 94
90. Typically, protection is implicitly denied to such groups by imposing require-
ments of compensation for employees and general circulation for the publication. See
IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-3-5-1 (Burs Supp. 1975). The statute protects "any person...
employed by, a newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals and having a
general circulation .... " (Emphasis added.) See also N.Y. CV. RIGHTs LAW § 79-
h (McKinney Supp. 1975-76) defining "newspaper" as "a paper that is printed and dis-
tributed ordinarily not less frequently than once a week, and has done so for at least
one year... has a paid circulation and has been entered at United States post-office
as second-class matter."
91. Privilege statutes do not provide that a newsman is incompetent to testify at all;
they merely permit him to refuse to answer certain questions about confidential sources.
In regard to other matters, a newsman must give testimony as any other ordinary citizen.
92. See Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Print. & Pub. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d
416 (Super. Ct. L. Div. 1964).
93. Id. See also Note, State Newsman's Privilege Statutes: A Critical Analysis, 49
NOTRE DA E LAw. 150, 154 (1973).
94. A good waiver provision is set forth in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4325 (1974)
(emphasis added):
If a reporter waives the privilege provided by this subchapter wtih re-
spect to certain facts, he may be cross-examined on the testimony or other
evidence he gives concerning those facts but not on other facts with respect
[Vol. 11:258
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The Oklahoma statute can be criticized as well for its failure to
define the "source" of information. This omission is particularly unfor-
tunate, since it leaves open two critical questions regarding protection:
(1) whether "source!' refers only to an individual or whether it can be
broadly defined to include tapes and other means through which infor-
mation is obtained;95 (2) whether the "source" protection in the statute
includes the personal observations of the newsman.9 6  Regardless of
the Legislature's intent, these questions should be resolved in a statu-
tory definition of "source." 97 Without such a definition, the courts are
free to limit or expand statutory protection by implementing their own
definitions.
Another weakness of the Oklahoma statute is its failure to express-
ly extend or deny protection to sources and confidential information
given to a former newsman before his employment was terminated. 8
In an appropriate case, a court could possibly conclude that a former
newsman is not covered by the statute which is drafted in terms of pres-
ent employment. To alleviate this problem the statutory definition of
newsman should be amended to include anyone who was a newsman
at the time the information was received, though not at the time the
privilege is claimed.
The most serious problem with the statute concerns the procedure
for divesting a newsman of his privilege. In a state such as Oklahoma
that affords only conditional shield protection, the most important as-
pect of the privilege statute should be the section detailing how -that
privilege can be lost; however, Oklahoma's law contains only a single
sentence relating to divestment.9
The statute should provide some procedural guidelines by which
the courts can decide if the party seeking disclosure has established
its relevancy. The considerations should include "the importance of the
issue on which the information is relevant, . . the circumstances un-
der which the reporter obtained the information, and the likely effect
that disclosure of the information will have on the future flow of infor-
to which he claims the privilege. A reporter does not waive or forfeit the
privilege by disclosing all or any part of the information protected by the
privilege to any other person.
95. See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
97. For a comprehensive definition of "source" see DEL. CODB ANN. tit. 10, § 4320
(5) (1974).
98. See notes 72 & 73 supra and accompanying text.
99. Ox A. STAT. tit. 12, § 385.1 (Supp. 1975).
1975]
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mation to the public."' 0 A court might also consider "the nature of
the proceeding, the merits of the claim or defense, [and] the adequacy
of the remedy otherwise available. .. .
The Oklahoma law should also provide for an immediate appeal
from an order by a court divesting the journalist of his privilege. Under
the current statute the body before whom the newsman is claiming the
privilege has the power to revoke that privilege. A number of states
require that the party seeking disclosure apply to the district court,
which then decides whether or not to compel testimony.10 2 At the very
least, there should be a right to appeal to a court other than the one
hearing the original action.
Finally, Oklahoma should consider the adoption of a new test for
divestment. The privilege is currently conditioned on the absence of
findings that the information sought is relevant to a significant issue in
the action and that the information is not available by alternate means.
This test requires a determination of what is "relevant" and what a
"significant issue" involves. The statute endows the court making the
determination with a great deal of discretion and the result could be a
complete lack of uniform treatment as different courts reach different
results. A better test could be fashioned after that suggested in Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion in Branzburg. Justice Stewart's three-
pronged test requires
that the government must (1) show that there is probable
cause to believe that the newsman has information that is
clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2)
demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained
by alternative means less destructive of First Amendment
rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding in-
terest in the information. 03
V. CONCLUSION
Many observers predicted that the furor engendered by the Branz-
burg decision would gradually subside with the passage of time. Fortu-
nately, events over the last three years have indicated an opposite trend.
The courts have continually chipped away at the sweeping scope of
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4323 (1974).
101. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (1970).
102. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 45:1453 (Supp. 1975), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1
(Supp. 1975).
103. 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
276 [Vol. 11:258
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Branzburg and more states are passing shield laws to ward off its far-
reaching effects.
Today, various state shield statutes furnish the newsman with the
best available protection. 01 There remains, however, a pressing need
for uniform shield legislation. In the author's opinion, the answer lies
in federal legislation, although none of the bills which were introduced
in Congress has surfaced from committee. 0 5
The federal government has eased the newsman's plight lately by
seeking fewer subpoenas aimed at the reporter's confidential work prod-
uct.10 6 This is, perhaps, a step in the right direction. Former Senator
104. Though more and more states are enacting shield legislation protecting news-
men, Blasi points out that the lack of awareness of these statutes by newsmen is remark-
able:
We asked the respondents, "Does the state in which you do most of your
work have a 'shield law' which protects the confidentiality of source relation-
ships in certain circumstances?" Of the 421 respondents in our survey who
listed one of the shield law states as the state in which they do most of their
work, only 149 (35.4%) were able to say with certainty that their state has a
statutory privilege for newsmen; 211 (50.1%) said, "I'm not certain," and
61 (14.5%) were under the mistaken impression that their state has no shield
law.
Blasi, supra note 10, at 275-76.
105. Five bills were introduced in the House of Representatives during the first ses-
sion of the Ninety-sixth Congress: H.R. 6213, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 3655,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 562, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 215, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 172, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
106. United States Department of Justice, Order No. 544-73 provides in part:
Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of
reporters to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power of the
government should not be used in such a way that it impairs a reporter's re-
sponsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial public issues. In
balancing the concern that the Department of Justice has for the work of the
news media and the Department's obligation to the fair administration ofjustice, the following guidelines shall be adhered to by all members of the
Department:
(a) In determining whether to request issuance of a subpoena to the
news media, the approach in every case must be to strike the proper balance
between the public's interest in the free dissemination of ideas and informa-
tion and the public's interest in effective law enforcement and the fair ad-
ministration of justice.
(e) In requesting the Attorney General's authorization for a subpoena,
the following principles will apply:
(1) There should be reasonable ground based on information ob-
tained from nonmedia sources that a crime has occurred.(2) There should be reasonable ground to believe that the in-
formation sought is essential to a successful investigation-particularly
with reference to directly establishing guilt or innocence. The subpoena
should not be used to obtain peripheral, non essential or speculative
information.
(3) The government should have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
the information from alternative nonmedia sources.
(4) The use of subpoenas to members of the news media should,
except under exigent circumstances, be limited to the verification of pub-
20
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Sam Ervin has written that "[E]ven with Branzburg on the books, the
free flow of information might not be stifled if the parties concerned are
willing to restrain themselves.110 7  In the absence of an absolute consti-
tutional or statutory privilege, restraint may well be the only protection
afforded to newsmen.
Ben Singletary
lished information and to such surrounding circumstances as relate to
the accuracy of the published information.
28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1975).
107. Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HAiv. I. LEcis. 233, 276 (1974).
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